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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines the evolution of the corporate profit base and the
relationship between book income and tax income for U.S. corporations
over the last two decades. The paper demonstrates that this relationship
has broken down over the 1990s, and it has broken down in a manner
consistent with increased tax-sheltering activity. The paper traces the
growing discrepancy between book income and tax income associated
with differential treatments of depreciation, the reporting of foreign
source income, and in particular the changing nature of employee com-
pensation. For the largest public companies, proceeds from option exer-
cises equaled 27 percent of operating cash flow from 1996 to 2000. These
deductions appear to be fully utilized, thereby creating the largest distinc-
tion between book income and tax income. While the differential treat-
ment of these items has historically accounted fully for the discrepancy
between book income and tax income, this paper demonstrates that book
and tax income have diverged markedly for reasons not associated with
these items during the late 1990s. In 1998, more than half the difference
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between tax and book income—approximately $154.4 billion, or 33.7 per-
cent of tax income—cannot be accounted for by these factors. This paper
proceeds to develop and test a model of costly tax sheltering and demon-
strates that the breakdown in the relationship between tax income and
book income is consistent with increasing levels of sheltering during the
late 1990s. These tests also explore an alternative explanation of these re-
sults—coincident increased levels of earnings management—and find
that the nature of the breakdown between book and tax income cannot
be explained fully by this alternative explanation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in the corporate profit base, and the tax revenues it gener-
ates, have drawn considerable attention. In particular, the gap between
book income and tax income has reportedly widened over the last decade,
and corporate tax receipts have been lower than expected. Seen against
the backdrop of a protracted economic expansion over the 1990s, these
trends have generated considerable concern over the proliferation of tax-
sheltering activity by corporations. These concerns have been amplified
further by anecdotal evidence on the proliferation of these schemes and
by high-profile cases associated with large corporations. Estimates of tax-
sheltering activity have ranged widely, depending on the source and
methodology employed in generating those estimates.
1
The focus on corporate tax shelters raises several new questions related
to the integrity of the corporate tax base. In particular, financial innova-
tions that reduce the costs of, and widen the scope for, recharacterizing
income may lead to difficulties in maintaining the corporate tax base. Sim-
ilarly, the increased importance of legitimate foreign operations for U.S.
firms, the attendant transfer-pricing opportunities afforded by such oper-
ations, and increased competition by jurisdictions for those investments
may increase the scope for income shifting. In short, U.S. firms are faced
with enhanced opportunities for avoiding or evading corporate taxes
through cheaper, more sophisticated, and less transparent mechanisms.
These questions and concerns over the viability of the corporate tax
base and the scope of sheltering activity have given rise to varied legisla-
tive proposals but limited empirical analysis of the claims associated with
increased tax-sheltering activity. Additionally, evidence on sheltering ac-
1 The concerns regarding the scope and increased incidence of tax shelters can be found in
various sources, including Bankman (1999), Sullivan (1999a, 1999b, 2000a) and U.S. Treasury
(1999). Talisman (1999) and Kies (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, and 2000) provide alternative interpre-
tations of these trends. For a perspective on the variety of instruments associated with shel-
tering activity, see U.S. Treasury (1999).The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 171
tivity that comes from reported book income and tax income raises the
issue of other differences that might arise between book and tax income
and their growing incidence or magnitude. Thus, empirical explorations
of the nature of sheltering activity must jointly investigate the changing
nature of book and tax income to identify any underlying trends in the
gaps that separate them.
2
This paper attempts to illuminate recent trends in the corporate profit
base to highlight the possible aggregate scope of sheltering activity, the
other determinants of the gaps between book and tax income and their
scope for explaining recent trends, and the dynamics of the relationship
between tax and book income over the last decade. The evidence provided
in this paper demonstrates that the link between book and tax income
has broken down over the last decade for two reasons. First, the identifi-
able factors that have been associated traditionally with the distinction
between book and tax income have grown tremendously. In addition to
the growing relevance of overseas operations and the different measures
of depreciation, the paper explores the proliferation of employee stock
options (ESOs) and quantifies their impact on the corporate profit base.
From 1996 to 2000, net proceeds from the exercise of ESOs for the largest
U.S. corporations approximated 27 percent of operating cash flows. These
net proceeds appear to be utilized nearly fully as deductions against pre-
tax income for the corporations studied.
Second, the breakdown between tax income and book income is not
limited to the growth of these traditional distinctions between tax and
book income. While the distinctive treatment of these items has histori-
cally accounted fully for the difference between book and tax income, the
paper demonstrates that book and tax income have diverged markedly
for reasons not associated with these items during the late 1990s. In 1998,
more than half of the difference between tax and book income—approxi-
mately $154.4 billion, or 33.7 percent of tax income—cannot be accounted
for by these historically relevant measures of the discrepancy between tax
and book income.
To identify the reasons for this breakdown, the paper develops a model
of tax sheltering and then tests that model by exploring the dynamic of
2 The difficulties in isolating these activities precisely should not be understated. After sur-
veying varied and conflicting estimates of the nature of sheltering activity, Joint Committee
on Taxation (2000) states, "[T]he Joint Committee staff believes that direct measurement of
corporate tax shelter activity through macroeconomic data is not possible. Instead, a more
instructive approach may be to analyze specific tax shelter transactions that have come to
light and evaluate their effect on corporate receipts" (p. 16). While not disagreeing with this
approach, I attempt in this paper at least to uncover evidence of the underlying trend in
sheltering activity and some evidence of the overall scope at the macroeconomic level to
inform the debate.172 Desai
the link between tax income and book income over time and by levels of
tax income. The estimates motivated by this model of sheltering provide
evidence that the patterns of the deteriorating link between tax and book
income are consistent with increased levels of sheltering over the decade.
One important alternative hypothesis—that the breakdown of the link
between tax income and book income reflects coincident increased levels
of earnings management—is also investigated. Measures associated tradi-
tionally with different levels of, or motives for, earnings management do
not appear to explain fully the distinctive nature of the breakdown of the
link between tax and book income in the latter part of the decade. Taken
together, the evidence suggests that the large, unexplained gaps between
tax and book income that have arisen during the late 1990s are at least
partly associated with increased sheltering activity.
Section 2 reviews alternative methodologies for understanding the dy-
namics of corporate profits and their relative merits and recent findings.
Section 3 examines the changing relationship between tax income and
book income as viewed through the lens of aggregated data generated
from tax forms where firms reconcile tax and book income. Section 4 re-
views in detail the changing nature of employee compensation and its
impact on the corporate profit base by exploiting several different sources
of data on option exercises. Section 5 of the paper develops a model of
tax-sheltering activity and then tests that model through analyses of book
and tax income generated from accounting statements over the 1990s,
with special attention paid to the alternative explanation of earnings man-
agement. Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2. PREVIOUS WORK AND REVIEW OF
ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES
Efforts to understand the dynamics of corporate profits and tax revenues
typically rely on three distinct sources: (1) economy-wide aggregate data
taken from national income accounts, (2) reported tax and book income
from tax forms, and (3) reported book income and simulated tax income
from accounting statements. Each of these sources has distinct advantages
and disadvantages in understanding the scope of tax-sheltering activity
and, unsurprisingly, each yields different conclusions. These distinct
sources and methodologies also provide much confusion about their con-
flicting implications.
National income accounts provide the most aggregate picture of corpo-
rate profitability and allow for a disentangling of the different reasons
why average tax rates depart from statutory rates. By implementing theThe Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 173
procedure proposed in Auerbach and Poterba (1987), Mackie (2000) pro-
vides this perspective on recent corporate profitability and the implica-
tions for recent tax collections. He documents a reduced average tax rate
amid rising corporate profitability and traces several rationales for this
phenomenon. Mackie concludes that this aggregate perspective cannot
illuminate the nature of tax-sheltering activity as the basic income mea-
sure employed prevents any corresponding measure of what income
would have been in the absence of sheltering activity. In other words,
typical shelters reduce both income and taxes, leaving average tax rates
unaffected.
3
To understand the scope of sheltering activity, the joint reporting of
book income and tax income affords the promise of measuring activity
reported to shareholders but not reported to tax authorities. Indeed, much
of the recent concern over tax shelters reflects the use of Treasury data
to construct comparisons between tax income and book income as re-
ported in Schedule M-l. The joint reporting of book income and tax in-
come by firms in their tax forms affords the possibility of analyzing the
gap between the two notions of income and the varied determinants of
that gap. The reconciliation between book and tax income in Schedule
M-l is of limited detail and, consequently, parsing out alternative expla-
nations of the gap is difficult. Finally, the use of the micro data is limited
given accessibility and confidentiality requirements imposed by the IRS.
4
Nonetheless, the aggregate perspective afforded by this reporting, along
with the ability to analyze true tax income as opposed to simulated tax
income, makes this a valuable source.
Accounting statements can also be used to generate comparisons be-
tween book income and simulated tax income. In particular, there is an
extensive literature gauging the reliability of alternative estimates of tax
income generated from accounting statements by explicitly comparing
them to IRS data on tax income.
5 These studies then typically go on to
study the differences between book and tax income, as generated by the
accounting statements, to study the nature of permanent and temporary
3 For a related effort, see Petrick (2001) for a comparison on NIPA profits with S&P 500
profits, and a discussion of the compositional reasons why these measures may differ.
4 Plesko (2002) provides a detailed reconciliation for 1996-1998. Using a distinct measure
of pretax book income and tax net income from Talisman (1999) and the one employed in
this paper, he finds that the difference between pretax book income and tax net income
grew by 71.9 percent between 1996 and 1998. His measure of the aggregate difference be-
tween pretax book and tax income as reported by firms is $159 billion in 1998.
5 See Plesko (2000,2003) and Mills and Newberry (2001) for a discussion of these alternative
measures and their relative merits.174 Desai
differences in tax accounting. These estimates of book and simulated tax
income can also be employed to infer something about tax-sheltering ac-
tivity, as in Manzon and Plesko (2001). Manzon and Plesko (2001) study
the gap between accounting-based definitions of tax income and book
income, and demonstrate that a few measures approximating the demand
for tax shelters help explain the cross-sectional variation in these gaps.
6
As noted by Hanlon and Shevlin (2001), the estimates of book and tax
income generated by accounting statements do not encompass the same
differences as those generated by viewing differences between book and
tax income as reported on tax forms. In particular, deductions associated
with the exercise of stock options will not be represented in the gap be-
tween book and tax income generated from accounting statements but
will show up in the gap generated using tax forms.
7 In addition to this
distinction in the reporting of deductions associated with option exercises,
any analysis of book income must address potential managerial motives
to manage earnings. Many authors have contributed to the literature that
tries to define, document, and understand the motivation behind earnings
management.
8 While the magnitude and impact of such behavior remains
in question, it is conceivable that trends in earnings management could
result in systematic variation in book and tax income.
The analysis that follows attempts to use the IRS and accounting
sources of tax and book income to illuminate the problem of tax shelters.
The aggregate view, as represented by IRS data, is analyzed in section 3
in tandem with an exploration of the impact of ESOs in section 4. The
disaggregated view generated by accounting statements is analyzed in
section 5 by developing a model of tax sheltering and then testing it. This
analysis also discusses the possibility that earnings management might
result in similar empirical patterns and tries to distinguish sheltering ac-
tivity from earnings management.
6 Manzon and Plesko (2001) relate the absolute magnitude of the gap to possible determi-
nants of demand for sheltering activity. They find that dummy variables associated with
the presence of pretax profits and net operating losses help predict the size of the gap in a
cross-sectional regression.
7 This difference results from the departure from "clean surplus" accounting in the account-
ing of stock options. In short, tax benefits from exercise of ESOs do not flow through the
income statement but are simply transferred to additional paid-in capital. As a consequence,
tax expenses from accounting statements won't allow for consideration of the deductions
associated with exercises. The reporting of these tax benefits associated with employee exer-
cises is continuing to evolve, and Hanlon and Shevlin (2001) argue that varied estimates of
tax rates make the mistake of inferring tax rates without consideration for the effects of
these tax benefits.
8 See Dechow and Skinner (2000), Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Schipper (1989) for review
articles of this literature.The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 175
3. TAX INCOME, SIMULATED BOOK INCOME,
AND ACTUAL BOOK INCOME
Concerns over increased sheltering activities by corporations are typically
associated with trends in corporate tax receipts and trends in the gap
between tax income and book income employing figures extracted from
tax returns. Figure 1 considers the ratio of federal corporate tax receipts
to all federal on-budget tax receipts from 1971 to 2001, as reported in
Office of Management and Budget (2002). The figure depicts the overall
decline in that ratio, from nearly 19.7 percent in 1977 to 10.2 percent in
2001. Much of the pattern in this ratio for the intervening years can be
explained by large legislative changes and general economic conditions.
The recent decline, beginning in 1996, is more puzzling given the coinci-
dent economic expansion. In particular, this ratio falls from 15.8 percent
in 1996 to 13.5 percent in 2000 and then, even more dramatically, to 10.2
percent in 2001.
The relationship between tax and book income as reported in Schedule
M-l demonstrates a similarly curious trend. These figures have been em-
ployed by the Treasury Department to emphasize the increased incidence
and magnitude of corporate tax shelter activity. Figure 2 reproduces a
figure from Talisman (1999) that is also related to the figure employed in
the Treasury Department's study of corporate tax shelters (U.S. Treasury,
FIGURE 1. Corporate Tax Receipts as Percentage of Total On-Budget
Receipts, 1971-2001
25
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
The graph shows the ratio of corporate tax receipts to all on-budget federal receipts, as reported in Office
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1999). This graph employs data for only those corporations with assets
greater than $1 billion. Inferring a multiple of book income over tax in-
come from that graph illustrates the concern that tax-sheltering activity
has increased over that period. In particular, the ratio of book income to
tax income grows to 1.4 from 1.0 over five years. Alternatively, book in-
come exceeds tax income by approximately $120 billion (in 1992 dollars)
by 1996. This figure, and the gap it highlights, has served as the most
important source of data for the debate on corporate tax shelters. As
pointed out by Kies (1999a), however, there are several alternative expla-
nations for this gap that make such a picture inconclusive.
To understand the implication of this widening gap for the scope of
tax-sheltering activity, it is useful to construct a measure of simulated
book income that incorporates identifiable sources of that gap. In particu-
lar, discrepancies between tax and book income may be attributable to
causes unrelated to tax-sheltering activity. The evidence in Table 1 and
Figure 3 considers the dynamics of tax and book income for firms that
have assets greater than $250 million and isolates the impact stemming
from three potential sources of that gap: (1) the differential treatment of
depreciation expense on tax and book forms, (2) reinvested earnings
abroad, and (3) deductions associated with the exercise of nonqualified
stock options. Before analyzing the data, the distinctions between the two
sets of data should be emphasized. Figure 2 employs actual tax return
data from 1991 to 1996 to analyze the gap between actual tax and book
income for corporations that have more than $1 billion in assets and are
not S-corporations, RICs, or REITs. In contrast, Table 1 and Figure 3 ini-
tially simulate that gap for similar corporations, but with a cutoff of $250
million in assets over the period from 1982 to 2000.
Table 1 provides data, in current dollars, for simulating book income
for these corporations and begins with an estimate of tax income compa-
rable to the base in the Talisman figure. To analyze the impact of the
discrepancy between depreciation expense allowed for tax purposes and
that associated with book accounting, Table 1 draws on Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) estimates of the capital consumption allowance
(CCA) adjustment, which measures the discrepancy between tax mea-
sures of depreciation and economic depreciation. This aggregate measure
of the discrepancy is scaled by that fraction of depreciation expenses for
firms with over $250 million in assets. To the degree that economic depre-
ciation is not representative of depreciation associated with historic cost
accounting, and to the degree that this link between accounting and eco-
nomic depreciation has become more tenuous over time given the chang-
ing nature of assets, the evidence in Table 1 likely understates the impact
associated with gaps between tax and accounting notions of depreciation.178 Desai
TABLE 1

































































































































* All dollar figures are in current dollars. Tax income is total receipts less total deductions for firms with
greater than $250 million in assets, excluding RICs, REITs, and S-corporations. The tax income figures
for 1999 and 2000 are not available, so the simulated book income figure assumes that tax income stays
at 1998 levels. Excess depreciation corresponds to the CCA adjustment scaled for the relative use of
depreciation by firms with greater than $250 million in assets. Reinvested earnings abroad are the differ-
ence between foreign earnings and repatriations scaled for the relative levels of foreign income for firms
with greater than $250 million in assets. Option exercises are the proceeds from exercises, as more fully
reported in Table 2. Simulated book income is the sum of those figures.
Similarly, Table 1 captures the discrepancy between income earned by
U.S. corporations operating abroad and the income that is repatriated
from BE A data on capital flows.
9 Finally, Table 1 provides data from
Execucomp on the aggregate level of option exercises by employees,
which is discussed in greater detail below. These data are available only
for years subsequent to 1992. Tax income from 1999 and 2000 is not yet
available but is presumed to stay at 1998 levels to facilitate a baseline
comparison for 1999 and 2000.
Figure 3 relates the findings of Table 1 in a format comparable to
the evidence provided in Figure 2 by translating the figures from Table 1
9 These figures are scaled by the annual fraction of foreign tax credits attributable to firms
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into 1992 dollars. The bottom line in Figure 3 presents tax income, and
each line above it adds an identifiable source of the difference between
tax income and book income so that the uppermost line represents simu-
lated book income. The evidence provided in Figure 3 indicates several
important features of the changing nature of the relationship between
book income and tax income. First, while gaps between tax income and
book income were associated with differing notions of depreciation dur-
ing the 1980s, the role of depreciation differences is now considerably
smaller. Nonetheless, recent years feature a renewed distinction between
tax and economic notions of depreciation that maps to the tax income
and book income gap. Second, reinvested earnings abroad, which may
reflect both increased foreign activity as well as changed repatriation pat-
terns, are growing in importance and are contributing significantly to-
ward a larger gap.
1
0 Finally, differing treatment of exercises of ESOs now
provides the largest component of the growing gap between tax and sim-
ulated book income. By 1998, these three sources comprised 29.0 percent
of tax income. The divergence of simulated book income and tax income
through the last decade appears to be growing particularly rapidly near
the end of the decade. While precisely comparable ratios are not yet avail-
able for 1999 and 2000 (because tax income is not available), it is clear
that these discrepancies—particularly option exercises and reinvested
earnings abroad—have grown even more rapidly after 1998.
While this comparison between tax income and simulated book income
suggests that these two series have become increasingly distinct during
the 1990s for identifiable reasons, it is even more striking how actual book
income relates to reported tax income and simulated book income. Figure
3 plots—with dots—actual book income from 1986 to 1998 for this same
set of firms.
1
1 From 1986 to 1993, actual book income tracks simulated
book income remarkably well, with the exception of 1992, when actual
book income dips below both simulated book income and tax income.
Beginning in 1994, however, actual book income begins to diverge rapidly
from both tax income and simulated book income. This divergence is most
acute in 1998, when tax income falls by 10.9 percent, simulated book in-
come falls by 5.9 percent, and actual book income rises by 0.8 percent. By
1
0 These changed patterns of repatriation may themselves reflect increased levels of the relo-
cation of income in response to tax incentives. For a recent study of repatriation patterns
and their responsiveness to tax incentives, see Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001). For the use
of changed ownership forms in response to international tax incentives, see Desai, Foley,
and Hines (2003) on indirect ownership of foreign affiliates and Desai and Hines (2002) on
expatriations.
1
1 This series was provided by the IRS. Figures for 1989 are available only for all firms, so
the amounts associated with filers with more than $250 million in assets is interpolated from
similar ratios for 1988 and 1990.The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 181
1998, this divergence results in actual book income being 1.63 times tax
income and 1.26 times simulated book income. Indeed, in 1998, more than
half of the difference between tax income and actual book income—ap-
proximately $154.4 billion, or 33.7 percent of tax income—cannot be ac-
counted for by these sources of the distinction between tax income and
book income.
This breakdown between both actual book income and tax income and
between actual book income and simulated book income can have several
alternative explanations. First, the identified sources of differences be-
tween tax income and book income that have been estimated—particu-
larly the scope of option exercises—could be understated in Figure 3 and
Table 1, and these sources could account for an even larger fraction of
the difference between tax income and actual book income. The following
section investigates the actual scope of option exercises in more detail to
consider this possibility. Second, alternative discrepancies between book
income and tax income, such as the proliferation of hybrid instruments
that provide for deductions to tax income but not book income or the
differential treatment of pension earnings, could account for some frac-
tion of the gap. Aggregate estimates of such activity suggest that these
sources are not likely to be large enough to comprise significant fractions
of the unexplained difference between book income and tax income.
1
2
Third, earnings management, either through the intertemporal shifting
of income or through fraudulent book reporting, could be associated with
this gap. This possibility is investigated further in section 5, but it is worth
noting the distinction in the beliefs of practitioners and researchers on the
scope of earnings management. In particular, Dechow and Skinner (2000)
note, "[W]hile practitioners and regulators seem to believe that earnings
management is both pervasive and problematic, academic research has
not demonstrated that earnings management has a large effect on average
1
2 For example, Engel, Erickson, and Maydew (1999) study a sample of all trust preferred
stock issued between 1993 and 1996 that amounts to $36 billion of issuances. A current query
of the Securities Data Corporation database for all securities classified as MIPS, TOPRS,
TRUPS, TRACES, or trust preferred of any kind, provides for $73 billion of issuance from
1993 to 2001. Only the periodic payments of these instruments would be associated with
the gap between book income and tax income, so it seems unlikely that such debt-equity
hybrid instruments can account for meaningful fractions of the unexplained difference. As
publicized widely in the press, Adams (2001) reports that for 30 percent of S&P 500 compa-
nies, pension earnings comprise an average of 12 percent of pretax income in 2000. Such a
figure, if true for all companies, would begin to account for a more significant portion of
the gap. For example, in 1998, such a ratio could account for 57 percent of the unexplained
difference. Firms that report such a figure, and on which such an average ratio is based,
are biased toward having material amounts to report, and many firms do not have defined
benefit plans that give rise to these differences, so such an extrapolation provides an extreme
upper bound on the potential for pension accounting to contribute to this difference.182 Desai
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* The data presented in this table are taken for the full universe of firms reported in the Execucomp
database. Grant values represent the dollar value using the Black-Scholes valuation model of option
grants; exercises represent the excess of the market value of shares exercised over the proceeds from
exercised options; the median share of all of a company's options (based on shares granted) accounted
for by the top five executives is the ratio of grants to the top five executives over grants to all employ-
ees. Grant values for all employees are determined by grossing up the value of grants to the top five
executives by a company's share of options granted to the top five executives; exercises for all employ-
ees are estimated by grossing up exercises of the top five executives by the average across all years of
the median share of all exercises, unless the average is less than 1%. Then exercises are grossed up
using 20%.
on reported earnings, or that whatever earnings management does exist
should concern investors." Finally, in contrast to an earnings management
explanation that emphasizes the inflation of book earnings, this gap could
reflect the artificial underreporting of tax income relative to book income.
This hypothesis is investigated through the model developed in section 5.
4. CHANGING TRENDS IN EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION AND THE CORPORATE TAX
BASE
The large and growing importance of option exercises as a reason that
the corporate tax base is shrinking is explored further in Tables 2, 3, and
4. Various studies have considered the incentive and behaviorial conse-
quences of options as a form of compensation.
1
3 Few, however, have con-
sidered the consequences associated with the proliferation of option
1
3 See Murphy (1999) for an overview or Core and Guay (2001) and Huddart and Lang
(1996) for a detailed study of exercise behavior.The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 183
TABLE 3
Estimates of Option Exercises, 1996-2000 (SEC Filings)*
Cumulative
Item 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1996-2000
Number of compa-
nies 145 142 139 113 109
Median option
exercises (mil-
lions of dollars) 147 149 135 96 52
Mean option exer-
cises (millions of











flow 29.1% 22.6% 19.6% 12.7% 9.8%
78,779 74,539 50,376 26,909 14,398







* This table presents data compiled from SEC filings for the universe of companies with the largest market
capitalization, as detailed in appendix table 1 of Desai (2002). Median, mean, and aggregate values of
option exercises are calculated as the excess of market value over the average strike price, where the
volume-weighted average price in a given year is used to establish market values. The median and mean
ratio of option exercises to operating cash flow scales estimated annual option exercises by operating cash
flows, or net income in the case of financial institutions. The underlying data for this table are provided
in appendix table 1, and the methodology is more fully described in the data appendix, of Desai (2002).
instruments for the corporate tax base.
1
4 Tax-related studies (e.g., Hall and
Liebman, 2000; Goolsbee, 2000a, 2000b) have emphasized the behavior
of top executives rather than the impact of these changed compensation
instruments on the corporate profit base.
Table 2 provides an overview of option-granting and exercise behavior




4 Sullivan (2000b), Bear Stearns (2000), and Mclntyre (2000) are exceptions. Each considers
a subsample of up to forty firms in an effort to gauge the overall impact of option exercises
on the corporate tax base.
1
5 The Execucomp database contains information on various types of compensation for top
executives in companies, including options granted and exercised to each executive and the
percentage these represent of all options granted and exercised, respectively, by all em-
ployees of each company, each year. These data are presented by executive and by company,
with up to five records (one for each executive) for each company, for each year. From these
individual executive/company/year records, it is possible to calculate aggregate grants and
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The data provided through Execucomp is limited to the granting and ex-
ercise behavior of the top five executives, given that mandatory reporting
centers on their behavior. It is possible, however, to extrapolate to all-
employee grants and exercises because firms are required to report the
share of total grants that correspond to the grants to the top five execu-
tives. While this process is straightforward for grants (because the share
for the top five is based on grants), the extrapolation is somewhat more
complicated for exercises requiring some additional assumptions.
1
6
Table 2 provides evidence of several trends in the impact of option-
granting and exercise behavior on the corporate profit base. First, the re-
markable rise in aggregate grants and exercises by the top five officers of
these firms over the period has resulted in grant values of over $16 billion
in 2000 to just the top five officers. This trend corresponds to a tenfold
increase over the decade. Second, option-granting behavior appears to be
deepening within firms at a rapid pace as the share represented by the
top five has decreased steadily from 29 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in
2000. Finally, the aggregate levels of grant values and exercises across all
employees, across all firms, mushroomed to over $100 billion (in the case
of annual exercises) in 2000, which corresponds to a sixfold increase over
the decade. The deepening of the use of incentive instruments in organiza-
tions, the absolute magnitudes of the amounts involved, and the prolifera-
tion of repricing strategies suggests that the proliferation of options will
likely survive a market downturn.
1
7
Given the extrapolation involved in Table 2, it is useful to undertake
a more detailed analysis of the largest 150 firms (by market value of eq-
uity) to ascertain the reliability of these estimates and the degree to which
they correspond to actual tax benefits.
1
8 Table 3 summarizes the evidence
1
6 Exercises for all employees were calculated by grossing up the exercises of the top five
executives in a year by the average ratio of grants to the top five executives over grants to
all employees for the sample period. If this average proved particularly low, this estimate
was recalculated using a ratio of 20 percent to prevent any spurious overstatement of aggre-
gate exercise levels. Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that all employees behave
similarly in their exercise behavior. Core and Guay (2001) and Huddart and Lang (1996)
compare the behavior of top executives and employees more generally and find that both
are sensitive to recent price performance. Given the additional reporting requirements of
the top five, it is conceivable that other employees are more opportunistic than the top five
executives.
1
7 Such a conclusion is necessarily speculative but the evidence on repricings in Brenner,
Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) and recent high-publicity events surrounding CEO compen-
sation suggest that levels of compensation are being adjusted on other margins to accommo-
date the levels of compensation recently enjoyed by CEOs.
1
8 Selecting on market value may create some biases. First, by selecting on market value,
these firms are likely to have some of the largest five-year returns. Thus, the potential for
realized gains might be the largest in this group. At the same time, this group excludesThe Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 187
that I provided in appendix table 1 of Desai (2002) on the behavior of
these firms and yields more precise—and comparable—estimates of the
impact of the proliferation of options on the corporate tax base.
1
9 Using
hand-collected data on the exercise of options, $78 billion was realized as
proceeds from option exercises for just the top 150 firms in 2000. This
figure corresponds to a mean ratio of proceeds from option exercises to
operating cash flow of 29 percent. Table 3 highlights the growing absolute
magnitude of the exercises and the growing ratio of those exercises to
measures of corporate profitability during the late 1990s. The detail in
appendix table 1 of Desai (2002) demonstrates that the use of options
is proliferating through firms of all types and is not limited to high-
technology or "new economy" companies. For various traditional con-
sumer goods and financial services firms—including Colgate Palmolive,
Safeway, and Home Depot—option net proceeds appear to comprise
more than 10 percent of operating cash flow or net income.
The proceeds from option exercises might not translate into tax deduc-
tions at the firm level for various reasons. In particular, loss-making firms,
firms employing incentive stock options, or firms employing variable-
priced options may not realize comparable tax benefits, as indicated by
their net proceeds from options exercises. Table 4 takes the 30 firms with
the largest ratio of option exercises to operating cash flow from appendix
table 1 of Desai (2002) and details their reporting of the tax benefits associ-
ated with option exercises.
2
0 As described in Hanlon and Shevlin (2001),
the incipient reporting of these tax benefits need not reflect the actual tax
benefits realized by firms. Nonetheless, 18 of the 30 firms with the largest
ratios of option exercises to operating cash flow report tax benefits associ-
ated with the exercises. (This propensity to report tax benefit figures corre-
sponds to the figures reported in Hanlon and Shevlin for Nasdaq firms.)
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable heterogeneity with some firms
(for example, eBay) reporting limited, if any, tax benefits from the deduc-
tions associated with the exercise of stock options. Nonetheless, for all
various smaller capitalization stocks that would have recently gone public and are most
likely to have used ESOs heavily during their earlier years. Finally, the market value ranking
was taken as of November 2001 and consequently does not include various firms that experi-
enced rapid gains and subsequent losses during the period from 1996 to 2000 and may have
experienced large proceeds from stock option realizations.
1
9 A more detailed discussion of the methodology employed in constructing the sample
underlying Table 3 is provided in the data appendix of Desai (2002).
2
0 The tax benefits from employee exercises of stock options were collected for 1998 through
2000 by examining both the statement of cash flows and the statement of shareholders'
equity in the consolidated financial statements reported in the 10-K (or other documents if
incorporated by reference).188 Desai
these firms reporting tax benefits, the average ratio of tax benefits to esti-
mated net proceeds from option exercises is 32 percent across the three
years, suggesting that the option exercise figures correspond to tax deduc-
tions that are being close to fully employed.
2
1 Taken together, Tables 2, 3,
and 4 suggest that the proliferation of option instruments to compensate
employees has had a significant role in creating a large and growing gap
between tax income and book income and in changing the corporate profit
base. Additionally, the more detailed study of the largest firms suggests
that the estimates from Execucomp for the overall corporate universe are
reliable estimates for the aggregate levels of the impact of option exercises
on the corporate tax base.
5. TESTING A MODEL OF COSTLY
SHELTERING WITH ACCOUNTING DATA
To isolate the degree to which the growing gap between tax income and
book income is associated with increased tax-sheltering activity, this sec-
tion begins with a discussion of the use of firm-level accounting data to
isolate book income and tax income. In this subsection, special attention
is paid to an alternative explanation for the emerging book income-tax
income gap—increasingly aggressive earnings management. To motivate
specific empirical tests of sheltering, a model of costly sheltering is then
developed and implemented with these accounting-based measures of
book income and tax income.
5.1 The Use of Accounting Data to Compare Book
Income and Tax Income
While Figures 2 and 3 consider the gap between tax income and book
income as generated by data from tax forms, an alternative methodology
that employs accounting data can be used to generate a related notion of
the gap between tax income and book income. As noted previously, the
gap generated by this methodology has an important difference from the
gap generated using data from tax forms: the accounting of stock option
activity removes this deduction from both tax income and book income.
Thus, the gap between estimates of tax income and book income gener-
ated from accounting data is unlikely to be associated with stock option
activity but could be associated with depreciation discrepancies or the
reporting of foreign source income as well as tax-sheltering activity. The
2
1 Reporting of the tax benefits does not appear to be standardized nor, as demonstrated
by Hanlon and Shevlin (2001), to be correlated necessarily with the tax deductions actually
taken by firms, so it is not clear that there is any sample bias by selecting on those firms
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use of accounting data also holds out the possibility of using micro data
more readily than what is available from aggregates based on tax forms.
Inferring tax income from accounting reported book income involves
various alternative measures of tax expense. Current and deferred tax
expenses are jointly considered to capture permanent and temporary dif-
ferences between tax and accounting reporting of income. Plesko (2003)
reviews the varied alternative methods for calculating tax expenses and
their correlations with actual tax income.
2
2 The analysis that follows em-
ploys the measure of tax liability associated with Stickney and McGee
(1982).
2
3 Use of the measures argued for by Porcano (1986), Zimmerman
(1983), and Shevlin (1987) do not yield dissimilar results in the regression
results that follow.
Figure 4 reports calculated tax income and book income, generated
from accounting statements, in 1992 dollars for a large universe of public
companies that comprise an unbalanced panel from 1982 to 2000. For this
large sample, there appear to be three distinct phases of the relationship
between book income and tax income. First, until the Tax Reform Act
(TRA) of 1986, book income far exceeded tax income. Second, from TRA
through the early 1990s, differences between book income and tax income
became considerably smaller. Finally, from the early 1990s, book income
has begun to diverge consistently from tax income. This gap reassuringly
mirrors the gap between book income and tax income presented in Fig-
ure 2.
While deductions associated with the net proceeds from stock option
exercises are not likely to be part of that gap, it is possible that changed
patterns of depreciation differences and reinvested earnings abroad might
contribute to this gap. Applying the same figures from Table 1 to the gap
in Figure 4 demonstrates that there still appears to be a considerable gap
between actual aggregate book income and simulated book income for
much of the 1990s. The adjustments associated with depreciation differ-
ences and reinvested earnings abroad are for all firms with assets greater
than $250 million, so the gap between book income and calculated tax
income would be even larger during the 1990s because the evidence in
Figure 4 is for only 6,000 firms. This gap appears to persist from 1982 to
2000 in a balanced panel of 500+ firms, and from 1992 to 2000 for an
unbalanced panel for which there exists detailed compensation data, as
presented in appendix figures la and lb of Desai (2002).
2
2 See also Callihan (1994); Kinney and Swanson (1993); Omer, Molloy, and Ziebart (1991);
and Dworin (1985) for additional discussion of the varied methodologies in using Compu-
stat data and the relative merits of alternative measures.
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The gap between tax income and book income could be associated with
a secular increase in managerial efforts to boost book income through
earnings management rather than a secular increase in efforts to depress
tax income. As discussed above, researchers have struggled to find aggre-
gate evidence of a meaningful, sustained role for earnings management.
Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the motives and evidence related to
earnings management so that empirical tests can attempt to discriminate
between these two explanations. Theories of earnings management typi-
cally try to explain management of earnings through smoothing, whereby
managers intertemporally shift income to accomplish different objectives.
Managers may smooth earnings to signal firm quality (Barnea, Ronen,
and Sadan, 1975), to influence future shareholders and long-run share
prices (Dye, 1988; Goel and Thakor, 2003), to derive incumbency rents
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), or to lower borrowing costs due to reduced
perceived probabilities of financial distress (Trueman and Titman, 1988).
For smoothing to explain the gaps depicted in Figure 3 would require a
massive, sustained borrowing from future earnings during the 1990s. The
earnings smoothing explanations of Figure 3 would also require that the
period during which earnings have been mortgaged has yet to occur.
Most of these models correspond to quarterly, and possibly annual,
smoothing of income, so it is hard to imagine the managerial motives that
could correspond to the long-run acceleration of income that would be
required for earnings smoothing to explain the gaps in Figure 3.
2
4
Empirical efforts to isolate earnings management typically employ one
of three methods that provide some instruction for the empirical tests that
follow. First, earnings management and smoothing can be detected by
looking for evidence of discretionary accrual accounting. In particular,
Jones (1991) develops a model of discretionary accruals that attempts to
isolate firms or industries with large amounts of discretion in accrual
methods. Studies tend to emphasize those industries with particularly
large opportunities for discretionary accruals, such as those provided in
banking, with provisions for loan loss reserves, in searching for evidence
of earnings management. Second, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and De-
george, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1998) try to detect earnings management
by examining the distribution of earnings around threshold levels, such
as the expected earnings of financial analysts. Finally, the underlying eco-
nomics of specific accounts, such as valuation allowances for deferred tax
assets, as in Miller and Skinner (1998), can be modeled, and then actual
2
4 In contrast to earnings smoothing, earnings management could take the form of fraudu-
lent reporting of book income. This practice is more difficult to distinguish from tax shelter-
ing, and efforts to disentangle the two are considered below.192 Desai
accrual behavior can be compared with predicted levels to isolate discre-
tionary accruals. The most convincing evidence of earnings management
comes from studies of distributions of earnings around threshold levels,
while other efforts reach contradictory conclusions regarding increased
levels of earnings management and the overall relevance of earnings man-
agement. The industry-specificity of discretionary accruals and the objec-
tive of smoothing earnings relative to thresholds suggest that industry
fixed effects, as well as sorting firms by relative levels of the variability
of book income relative to tax income, might usefully distinguish earnings
management explanations from tax-sheltering activities.
5.2 A Model of Corporate Tax Shelter Activity
To motivate the empirical tests of increased sheltering, the appendix to
this paper specifies a model of costly sheltering that suggests that in-
creased levels of sheltering will be evidenced by a distinctive relationship
between book income and tax income at low levels of tax income. More
specifically, the model suggests that sheltering will be reflected by a rela-
tively flatter relationship between book income and tax income at low
levels of tax income. The model generates an estimating equation [equa-
tion (7) in the appendix] that is tested through piecewise linear regres-
sions between book income and tax income. Increased levels of sheltering
will be reflected in a flattening of the relationship between tax income
and book income at low levels of tax income.
The intuition behind this result comes from the nature of the costs of
sheltering in the model developed in the appendix. It is useful to imagine
a world without sheltering initially. In such a world, estimation of equa-
tion (7) would result in a 45-degree line that compared tax income to book
income and that passed through the origin. The impact of sheltering in
altering the shape of that line would be a function of the nature of the costs
of sheltering. In particular, the costs of sheltering in this model would be
associated with the amounts sheltered and not the levels of true income,
conferring no advantage on those firms with large amounts of true eco-
nomic income. As a consequence, all firms would shelter so that they
avoid the same amount of tax. If there were no progressivity in the tax
schedule, then estimation of equation (7) would still result in a 45-degree
line, but the line would intersect the y axis at some nonzero level of book
income, reflecting the fact that all firms shelter some income to avoid a
given amount of taxes. Progressivity in the tax schedule, however, would
result in a flattening of the relationship between book income and tax
income at low levels of tax income because more income can be sheltered,
given the lower tax rates and the constant amount of tax liabilities being
avoided. In turn, increased levels of sheltering would be associated withThe Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 193
a flattening of the relationship between book income and tax income at
low levels of tax income.
2
5
Alternative specifications of the costs of sheltering would result in dis-
tinctive patterns in the relationship between tax income and book income.
For example, if costs of sheltering were a function of the fraction of true
income sheltered, thereby suggesting that firms with large amounts of
income would find it easier to shelter more income, then increased shelter-
ing would be associated with the initial 45-degree line taking on a para-
bolic shape. The specification employed above and tested below has the
advantage of being consistent with taxing authorities that maximize reve-
nue collection and with the notion that firms of different sizes face the
same probability of detection when sheltering a given amount of income.
5.3 Testing the Model of Tax Sheltering
As indicated above, increasing levels of tax sheltering should be evident
through a changed relationship between book income and tax income at
low levels of tax income. The analysis in Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6
employs a piecewise linear regression framework for relating the loga-
rithm of book income to the logarithm of tax income, and traces that rela-
tionship through the decade. This approach has the advantage of tracing
the changing relationship of tax income to book income over the decade
and testing for whether the disparity between book income and tax in-
come has become most pronounced for income tax filers with small
amounts of tax income.
In Table 5, observations are aggregated into three distinct subsample
periods to isolate the trends in the relationship between book income and
tax income. The specification employing data from 1992 to 1994 demon-
strates that coefficients become larger and more statistically significant as
tax income becomes larger. The more interesting pattern is the compari-
son across time periods. First, coefficients on the splines at low levels of
tax income become considerably smaller, dropping from 0.61 and 0.69 in
1992-1994 to 0.22 and 0.60 in 1998-2000, respectively. Additionally, the
significance of these estimates drops, and the overall degree to which tax
income predicts book income is reduced. Finally, the decreased levels of
coefficients are not nearly as pronounced at higher levels of tax income.
2
5 While it is possible to recast the problem of costly sheltering as a problem of costly earn-
ings management, a model of earnings management where inflating book income is costly
would not generate the curvature at low levels of tax income as it arises from the progres-
sivity of the tax schedule. Only if zero earnings were a particularly important threshold
level, and the costs of earnings management were a function of such a threshold, is it possible
to arrive at a theoretical model of earnings management that delivers corresponding empiri-
cal predictions. The empirical analysis below employs measures of the variability of earnings
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FIGURE 5. Book Income Versus Taxable Income, Spline Estimates by







The three lines in the figure are constructed using the coefficients of spline regressions reported in Table
5, where industry fixed effects are employed for the groups of years 1992-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-
2000.
FIGURE 6. Book Income Versus Taxable Income, Spline Estimates by
Year with Industry Fixed Effects, 1992-2000
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The lines in the figure are constructed using the coefficients of spline regressions reported in Table 6 of
Desai (2002), where industry fixed effects are employed for each year from 1992 to 2000.196 Desai
Given the industry-specificity of discretionary accrual opportunities, it
is useful to employ industry fixed effects in these piecewise linear regres-
sions in an effort to isolate a tax-sheltering explanation for this phenome-
non from an earnings management perspective. The results presented in
Table 5, with the inclusion of industry fixed effects, demonstrate that
within-industry variation provides even stronger evidence for a weaken-
ing of the relationship between book income and tax income at low levels
of tax income. The coefficients from the three specifications employing
industry fixed effects are used to construct the lines in Figure 5. This figure
provides the flattening of the relationship between book income and tax
income, as predicted in the model of costly sheltering over the course
of the 1990s. This same exercise is repeated by year with industry fixed
effects, and the results are presented in graphical form in Figure 6. Fig-
ure 6 provides similar results because the coefficients on the first spline
are positive and significant in early years of the sample and because
they approach 0 by 2000. As reported in Desai (2002), the explanatory
power of the regressions that underlies Figure 6 declines over the sample
period, further emphasizing the reduced link between book income and
tax income.
This regression evidence is difficult to reconcile with alternative ratio-
nales for the disparity between tax income and book income. For example,
if the differential measurement of depreciation or of reinvested earnings
abroad were to account wholly for this changed pattern, this differential
measurement would have to have become more concentrated among low-
tax-income firms during the 1990s. While these possibilities appear un-
likely, it is possible that the accounting of option exercises, if firms follow
clean surplus accounting, would have reduced tax income, as measured
by accounting statements, for young growth firms with low tax income.
Controlling separately for the levels of option activity in these regressions
demonstrates that option activity cannot explain this decoupling of book
income and tax income at low levels of tax income. To ensure that results
are not disproportionately reflecting the different behavior of small or
large firms, appendix table 2 and appendix figures la and lb of Desai
(2002) attempt the same piecewise linear regressions provided in Table 5
by dividing the sample at the median level of sales. The same patterns
appear to hold.
hi addition to using industry fixed effects to separate earnings manage-
ment explanations from tax-sheltering explanations, it is possible to con-
sider the relative variability of book income and tax income in an effort




6 Such a distinction resembles other studies that attempt to isolate earnings smoothers by
the relative absence of variability in reported earnings, as in Myers and Skinner (2001), who
















I CO CO ON O IN
oooincoNOi-H^oNNbcMcoLNONOoocooooinooNoooo
0^
" " • •--•-- "TticooNcoinco^cMoOi—iGOrHOOooLn
1
0
in •* CM CM co IN








pcMoorHiNCMoqcopcM "* co incONOcMONrHppoqK^
CN O.O O.O O.O O O O rH O O O T-H O O O O O rH O O
ooLNinmincMiNcM
o in ON i-H i-H co " '
co Tt< co in
CM












































































































































- OJ o 5J
.5 g "43 TJ





^ ns « to
"5 MH iS OJ
£ ° » g
oi 'C g _^
fill198 Desai
do so, ratios of the standard deviations of book income to tax income
are calculated for all the firms in the sample. This ratio has a median of
0.91, and firms with a ratio below the median are considered earnings-
smoothing firms and firms with a ratio above the median are considered
nonsmoothers. If earning management were a primary driver of the
breakdown of the relationship between book income and tax income at
low levels of tax income, then firms with different propensities to smooth
book income should exhibit a different relationship between tax income
and book income at low levels of tax income over the course of the decade.
The evidence provided in Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8 suggest otherwise
because both earnings smoothers and non-earnings smoothers exhibit
similar underlying trends over the course of the decade with respect to
a flattening of the book income-tax income relationship at low levels of
tax income.
The regression framework explored in Tables 5 and 6 and Figures 5 to
8 provides evidence that is consistent with the model of tax sheltering
FIGURE 7. Book Income Versus Taxable Income, Earnings-Smoothing
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The three lines in the figure are constructed using the coefficients of spline regressions reported in Table
6 for the groups of years 1992-1994,1995-1997, and 1998-2000. The figure employs regressions for two
samples of firms that are divided at the median ratio of the standard deviation of book income to the
standard deviation of taxable income. Firms with ratios above the median ratio are termed nonearnings-
smoothing firms, and those with ratios below the median ratio are termed earnings-smoothing firms.The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 199
FIGURE 8. Book Income Versus Taxable Income, Nonearnings-
Smoothing Firms, Spline Estimates by Three-Year Intervals with











The three lines in the figure are constructed using the coefficient of spline regressions reported in Table
6 for the groups of years 1992-1994,1995-1997, and 1998-2000. The figure employs regressions for two
samples of firms that are divided at the median ratio of the standard deviation of book income to the
standard deviation of taxable income. Firms with ratios above the median ratio are termed nonearnings-
smoothing firms, and those with ratios below the median ratio are termed earnings-smoothing firms.
provided in section 5.2. The implication of these results is that sheltering
became considerably less costly, either through lowered probabilities of
detection or perceived lower penalties, and that firms became more ag-
gressive during the 1990s. The alternative explanation of a secular in-
crease in earnings management is difficult to reconcile with the data
provided in the paper. First, earnings management theories typically do
not allow for such long-run intertemporal shifting of income, as would
be required to explain the aggregate trends in Figure 3. Second, if earnings
management opportunities are particularly associated with discretionary
accrual opportunities in some industries, then within-industry variation
should have reduced, rather than increased, evidence of this underlying
behavior in the micro evidence. Finally, if increased earnings manage-
ment were the cause of the flattening of the relationship between book
income and tax income at low levels of tax income, simple distinctions
in the relative variability of book income and tax income should have
demonstrated more pronounced differences in this breakdown. While it is
not possible to rule out earnings management definitively—particularly200 Desai
fraudulent book reporting of income—as a source of some of the aggre-
gate phenomena observed in Figure 3, this micro analysis suggests that
the distinctive way in which the relationship between book income and
tax income has deteriorated over the decade is consistent with increased
levels of costly sheltering.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to illuminate the debate on tax sheltering by disentan-
gling varied explanations for the breakdown in the relationship between
tax income and book income over the last decade. First, the paper demon-
strates that identifiable factors that once accounted for the difference be-
tween tax income and book income fail to account for the large gap
between book income and tax income in more recent years. In particular,
by 1998, more than half of the difference between tax income and book
income—approximately $154.4 billion, or 33.7 percent of tax income—
cannot be accounted for by these historically relevant measures of the
discrepancy between tax income and book income. Second, the paper
demonstrates that within those identifiable factors, changed patterns in
employee compensation are creating the largest disparity between book
income and tax income. By 1998, different treatment of employee options
accounted for nearly three times as much of the difference between book
income and tax income as did distinct definitions of depreciation.
By examining this same disparity between book income and tax income
using accounting data, this paper demonstrates that this breakdown has
been particularly pronounced at low levels of tax income and has degen-
erated progressively over the decade. These results are consistent with
the model of costly tax sheltering presented in the paper and decreased
costs of sheltering over the decade leading to greater gaps between tax
income and book income. Tests to check if these results are driven by
increased levels of earnings smoothing do not appear to diminish the re-
sults that suggest that increased tax sheltering is responsible for the dis-
tinctive breakdown in the relationship between book income and tax
income.
The large discrepancy reported between simulated book income and
actual book income from Figure 3, along with the regression evidence,
suggests that efforts by firms to circumvent tax payments are becoming
more significant, cheaper to implement, and harder to detect. These devel-
opments provide yet another reason to reevaluate the manner in which
corporate earnings are taxed because the underlying developments driv-
ing these phenomena—including increased access to global opportunities
and the rapid development of financial innovations—are unlikely to de-The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 201
cline in importance in the near future. Similarly, these trends illustrate
the need to revisit the rationales for distinctive book and tax reporting,
and the degree and manner in which firms are forced to reconcile book
income and tax income.
APPENDIX
In order to motivate the empirical tests of increased tax sheltering, it is
useful to specify a model of costly tax sheltering. Let I equal true economic
income, B equal reported book income, and T equal reported tax income.





u ~ N(0, a
2) (1)
To specify what tax income would be, let s equal sheltered income,
which is associated with costs y(s), which in turn are characterized by
y'(s) > 0 and y"(s) > 0. In this setting, the costs of sheltering correspond
only to the amount of income sheltered and not the amount of true eco-
nomic income. In other words, larger firms have no advantage in shelter-
ing income relative to smaller firms. As a consequence, tax income is given
by:
T = I-s- y(s) (2)
and the tax rate is a function of this taxable income, as represented by
x[I - s - y(s)].
Firms choose the amount of income to shelter by solving:
max [I - s - y(s)]{l - T[I - s - y(s)]} + s (3)
s
which yields the first-order condition:
-[1 + y'(s)][l - T(-)] + [I-s- y(s)][l + y'(s)]T'O + 1 = 0 (4)
To analyze this problem further, it is useful to consider two regions of
the tax schedule: one where there is progressivity and one where there202 Desai
is no progressivity. At sufficiently high levels of income, the tax rate will
exhibit no progressivity; T'Q = 0, and equation (4) will collapse to:
[1 + y'(s)][l - T0] = 1 (5)
At such levels of income, levels of sheltering will no longer vary with
levels of income because:
dl
As a consequence, it is possible to rewrite the level of tax income in equa-
tion (2) as:
T = I - s - y(s) = I - k (6)
Taking logarithms of both sides of equations (6) and (1) and employing
a first-order Taylor approximation, it is possible to rewrite equation (1)
as:
ln(B) = ln(I) + - + u (7)
which in turn becomes the estimating equation in the empirical analysis
that follows.
When levels of income are such that x'(-) ^ 0, the first-order condition
in equation (4) can be rewritten as an expression for tax income:
(1 - T) -
Y(S)] (8)
To make this equation tractable, it is useful to transform it into:
1 + y'(s)
(9)
where F(x) = [T'(-)X + x(-) — 1], and to define the inverse function as
G(z) = F~
l(z). This specification allows tax income to be rewritten as:The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income 203
T = G — (10)
\l+Y(s)J
The curvature of G(-) will be small when the curvature of F(-) is high, so
it becomes clear that at low levels of income
= 0.
dl
With respect to the estimating equation provided in equation (7), this
model suggests that the relationship between book income and tax in-
come will be distinctive at low levels of tax income, necessitating a
piecewise linear model to estimate equation (7). More specifically, the
model suggests that tax sheltering will be reflected by a relatively flatter
relationship between book income and tax income at low levels of tax
income. Correspondingly, increased levels of tax sheltering will be re-
flected in a flattening of the relationship between tax income and book
income.
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